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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAREN PENROSE, ; 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
JEFFREY PENROSE, ; 
Defendant/Appellee. ] 
) Case No. 950774-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JEFFREY PENROSE 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this action pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 78-2a-3(i) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
I. Issue: Whether the trial court made adequate and appropriate findings of fact 
supporting the amount of alimony it awarded to Ms. Penrose. 
Standard of Review: Clear and prejudicial abuse of discretion. Chambers v. 
Chambers, 840P.2d841 (UtahApp. 1992). 
II. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its distribution of the 
property and debts of the parties. 
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540 
(UtahApp. 1993). 
III. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining the amount 
of child support awarded to Ms. Penrose. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion. Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 
(UtahApp. 1995). 
IV. Issue: Whether the trial court abused its discretion by not awarding attorneys' 
fees to Ms. Penrose. 
Standard of Review: Clear abuse of discretion. Wells v. Wells, 871 P.2d 1036 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following statutes bear upon the issues in this case: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1995): See Addendum A attached hereto. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7 (Supp. 1995): 
(1) (a) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by 
prior court order unless there has been a material change of circumstance 
on the part of the obligor or obligee. 
(b) If the prior court order contains a stipulated provision for the 
automatic adjustment for prospective support, the prospective support 
shall be the amount as stated in the order, without a showing of a 
material change of circumstances, if the stipulated provision: 
(i) is clear and unambiguous; 
(ii) is self-executing; 
(iii) provides for the support which equals or exceeds the 
base child support award required by the guidelines; and 
(iv) does not allow a decrease in support as a result of the 
obligor's voluntary reduction of income. 
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances 
has occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall 
require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the 
guidelines before an order awarding child support or modifying an existing 
award may be granted. 
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the 
court shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including 
but not limited to: 
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties; 
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(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties; 
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn; 
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn; 
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child; 
(f) the ages of the parties; and 
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the 
support of others. 
(4) When no prior court order exists, the court shall determine and 
assess all arrearages based upon the Uniform Child Support Guidelines 
described in this chapter. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12 (Supp. 1995): 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level 
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be 
ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than 
the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support. 
STATEMENT QF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of 
Proceedings, and Disposition in the Court Below 
This action for divorce was filed on June 8, 1993. The trial took place before Judge 
Sandra N. Peuler on June 14 and 15, 1995. Findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a decree 
of divorce were entered on October 18, 1995. The decree of divorce provides that: 
1) The parties were awarded joint legal custody of their son, with Ms. 
Penrose to have primary physical custody and Mr. Penrose to have reasonable rights 
of visitation. The parties stipulated to this arrangement. 
2) Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay to Ms. Penrose child support of $669 
per month. 
3) Mr. Penrose was ordered to pay to Ms. Penrose alimony in the amount 
of $1,331 per month for an indefinite period of time, but no longer than the length of 
the marriage. 
4) The trial court divided the parties' assets and liabilities equally, based 
on its determination of the value of the assets and the nature of the liabilities. The 
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business, Designers Carpet Showroom, was awarded to Mr. Penrose since it provides 
his income. Mr. Penrose also received a Bronco, two snowmobiles, and a trailer. Ms. 
Penrose received a BMW. Mr. Penrose was awarded a certificate of deposit and 
ordered to pay the debt associated with the certificate of deposit. The parties' interest 
in Utah Water Sports was divided between them equally. Cash in an escrow account 
was used to equalize the division of the property, with Mr. Penrose receiving $69,000 
and Ms. Penrose receiving $109,000. 
5) The parties were each ordered to pay their own attorneys' fees and 
costs. 
Ms. Penrose filed a notice of appeal on November 13, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Plaintiff/appellant Karen Penrose ("Ms. Penrose") and defendant/appellee 
Jeffrey Penrose ("Mr. Penrose") were married August 24, 1992, in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
[Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 18, 1995 (hereinafter "Findings") 
no. 2, R. at 605; Transcript of Trial (hereinafter "Tr.") p. 21, R. at 764.] 
2. The parties have one child, Miles. At the time of trial, Miles was almost six 
years old. (Tr. p. 21, R. at 764.) 
3. At the time of trial, Ms. Penrose was thirty-four years old, with approximately 
one year of college education. (Tr. p. 24, R. at 767.) She had been employed full-time as a 
secretary prior to her marriage. She had also worked in the parties' business in Hawaii-
hiring and training employees, doing payroll, handling advertising, promotions, insurance, 
purchasing equipment, and in sales. She also worked in the Designers Carpet Showroom 
business. Ms. Penrose continued to work at Designers Carpet Showroom until May of 1993. 
(Tr. p. 27, R. at 770.) Ms. Penrose also volunteered for the Olympic Bid Committee. Id. 
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4. Based on Ms. Penrose's background and training, she could expect to make 
between $7.00 and $8.00 per hour, or $1,200 per month if she were employed full-time. 
(Findings no. 5, R. at 610.) If Ms. Penrose were fully employed, she could contribute 
approximately $900 per month net to payment of her own expenses. Id. 
5. Ms. Penrose has good health. Although she had planned a surgical procedure, 
the same procedure had been recommended to her six years ago following the birth of her 
child, and she had elected not to have surgery at that time. There was no evidence of any 
condition relating to her health that would interfere with her ability to obtain employment. 
The parties' child will begin kindergarten this fall and will be out of the home for one-half 
day during the school year. (Findings no. 5, R. at 609.) 
6. Prior to her marriage, Ms. Penrose received stock from her family. She has 
received regular monthly income from that stock. Although the exact amount of her income 
has fluctuated, she received at the time of trial about $900 per month. (Findings no. 5, R. at 
610.) 
7. Shortly after their marriage, Mr. and Ms. Penrose moved to Hawaii where 
they lived in a condominium owned by Ms. Penrose's parents. (Tr. p. 40, R. at 783.) They 
had the free use of that condominium. (Tr. p. 41, R. at 784.) Ms. Penrose's father also 
provided the parties with an automobile. (Findings no. 5, R. at 610; Tr. p. 41, R. at 784.) 
8. In 1988, the parties sold their business in Hawaii and moved back to Utah. 
(Tr. pp. 44-45, R. at 787-88.) 
9. The parties' lifestyle during their marriage was lavish. They traveled 
extensively, gave each other expensive gifts (such as jewelry, clothing, and furs), and owned 
luxury cars and expensive homes. Much of this lavish lifestyle was financed by Ms. 
Penrose's parents who provided the parties money, paid for their travel, and provided most of 
their financial living requirements for almost four years of their marriage. Because of the 
fact that Ms. Penrose's family provided a home and a vehicle during the time the parties lived 
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in Hawaii, they were able to concentrate their energy and resources on developing a business 
in Hawaii. Ultimately, they sold that business at a profit and were able to save a large sum of 
money from the earnings of the business. (Findings no. 5, R. at 610.) 
10. When the parties returned to Utah in 1988, the proceeds of the sale of their 
business and money saved from its profits were used to purchase a home and luxury cars. 
Thereafter, Ms. Penrose's parents continued to provide financial benefits to the parties that 
allowed them to maintain a lifestyle beyond what they could have afforded through their own 
income. In fact, the parties had spent all of the income from their business and had not set 
anything aside as savings. (Findings no. 5, R. at 611.) 
11. Mr. Penrose's income in the years 1991 through 1994 averaged approximately 
$126,000 from Designers Carpet Showroom. However, during those same years, Designers 
Carpet Showroom had failed to pay required sales tax from its business profits to the extent 
of approximately $46,000 per year. If that amount had been paid as required by law, the 
income of the parties from Designers Carpet Showroom would have averaged closer to 
$80,000 per year. Id. 
12. In 1994, Mr. Penrose's income from Designers Carpet Showroom was 
$107,188, or an average of $8,932 per month. In that year, the business paid the required 
sales tax. Therefore, the court found the appropriate income to attribute to Mr. Penrose was 
$8,932 per month. (Findings no. 5, R. at 611-12.) 
13. The court calculated child support based on Mr. Penrose's income of $8,932 
and Ms. Penrose's imputed income of $2,100 per month ($1,200 from employment, $900 
from family stock). (Findings no. 6, R. at 612.) 
14. The court found Ms. Penrose's reasonable living expenses to be $3,800 per 
month. The court specifically found that each of the parties had claimed excessive expenses 
based on the lifestyle they enjoyed during their marriage, which was financed not only by 
their own incomes, but also by savings accrued from their Hawaiian business and by Ms. 
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and during the time that Mr. Penrose was paying child support and alimony, and Mr. Penrose 
did not receive any benefit from them. (Tr. p. 298, R. at 1042.) 
18. Mr. Penrose had acquired a certificate of deposit to pledge in connection with 
his business, Utah Water Sports. The amount of that certificate of deposit originally was 
$65,000. However, Mr. Penrose had borrowed $40,000 in connection with the certificate of 
deposit from his grandmother. The court awarded the balance of the certificate of deposit, 
approximately $29,000, to Mr. Penrose and ordered him to repay $40,000 to his 
grandmother. (Findings no. 13(c), R. at 615.) 
19. The court divided the parties' interest in Utah Water Sports between them 
equally. (Findings no. 13(b), R. at 615.) 
20. The court awarded a Bronco, two snowmobiles, and a trailer to Mr. Penrose, 
and a BMW to Ms. Penrose. (Findings no. 13(e), R. at 616.) 
21. The parties had funds in escrow resulting from the sale of their marital 
residence. That sale occurred after their separation. The balance in the account was 
approximately $178,000. Ms. Penrose received $109,000 from that account, and Mr. Penrose 
received $69,000. The court made this unequal division of proceeds to equalize the property 
distribution. (Findings no. 13(g), R. at 616-17.) 
INACCURATE STATEMENTS FROM 
APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set forth in Ms. Penrose's brief contain some inaccurate 
statements. Those statements are as follows: 
1. Appellant's statement of fact no. 8 asserts that Ms. Penrose needs significant 
surgery in the foreseeable future. This statement ignores the trial court's finding that the 
same surgery was recommended to her six years ago and that she elected not to have surgery 
at that time. (Findings no. 5, R. at 609.) The statement further ignores the trial court's 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court in this case made careful, detailed findings of fact on the significant 
issues. Ms. Penrose has completely ignored those findings of fact in making the arguments 
set forth in her brief. She has further ignored her obligation to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings of fact and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are lacking in support. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the amount of alimony awarded to Ms. 
Penrose. The trial court made findings as to her reasonable needs, her ability to earn income, 
and the amount of income she receives from certain stock gifted to her by her family, and 
awarded sufficient alimony to her to meet her reasonable needs. 
The trial court also made careful and detailed findings of fact in support of its 50/50 
property division. The debt that Mr. Penrose was required to repay to his grandmother was 
documented and had been used to acquire an asset—the certificate of deposit which was 
awarded to him. The alleged debt to Ms. Penrose's father was incurred after the parties' 
separation for her personal needs, attorneys' fees, detective fees, and for her treatment at the 
Betty Ford Center. The uncontroverted evidence supports the valuation of Designers Carpet 
Showroom at zero, and that valuation was based on the testimony of the business evaluator 
agreed to by both parties. 
The trial court's child support award is also appropriate. The trial court is not 
required by Utah law to increase the amount of child support beyond the guideline amount 
when the parties' combined income exceeds the guidelines only slightly. 
The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorneys' fees to 
Ms. Penrose. 
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I ; I IMENI 
I. THE TRIAL COURI MADE ADEQUATE AND APPROPRIATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT SUPPORTING THE AMOUNT OF 
ALIMONY IT AWARDED TO MS. PENROSE. 
A. The Trial Court Was Not Required To Award Sufficient Alimony To 
Enable Ms. Penrose To Maintain the Same Standard of Living She 
Enjoyed During the Parties' Marriage. Since that Standard of Living 
Was Based on Support from Ms. Penrose's Family. 
A, w.v p.: * »>-3 c *se, Ms P nrose presented extensive testimonv ah -^ „ .Itru 
standard of living that tin parties enjcned during their marriage. Accordingly, the tr*ai . •».; i 
foun ' 'v * * .: * . -.J*.. 
6 M. HUL ..<;! \ . .. l.-uiu: \\\ : * u.v. ne parties niestwe uu*. Imaneed by 
plaintiffs parents. Mu> ga\c the parties money, paid for trips, and provided all their financial 
provided h\ \ ! - ; enro^ - paienLs. tnc trial vourt u> nu,: 
When the parties returned to Utah. . . ,:. me pioeeeds AW - u :... 
their business and money saved from the profits of the business were used u> 
purchase the first of the parties' homes and lu^n\ cars During the 
.•Continuation of the marriage, plaintiffs parents continued to provide gifts and 
other financial assistance to the parties that allowed them to maintain a 
lifestyle beyond what they could have afforded by their own efforts. The 
parties' lifestyle greatly exceeded the income actually derived from their 
businesses. 
(Findings no, 5, R. at MO I !.) 
Bolh par tus 'ih-n iiH4lik\: . , : ^ : : * . ^ . ':; L..J WKU. 
everything they earned and had not set anything aside as savings :-• mis case, the standard of 
living the parties enjoyed during the T.THIS-'O v r r not h vv i - o n **v T v r v of thk parties. 
Rather, the 1 rial com I: foi ind tha ; ^a:^ u\ ;.;rgc pan .. nnaaciai gih ai.; assistance 
provided by Ms. Penrose's parents V* hii/ it v- hko - MM MS nenrose OP muc u^ 
receive that financial assistance, Mr. Penrose will not. i). »•;•.::•.. 
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Penrose's parents purchased a home for her to live in, for which she purchased carpet, 
shutters, blinds, wallpaper, banisters, and new furniture. Ms. Penrose also leased a Mercedes 
through her father at a cost of $338 per month. 
Obviously, Mr. Penrose cannot be expected to pay alimony sufficient to replace all 
the gifts and financial assistance provided by Ms. Penrose's parents. In her brief, Ms. 
Penrose totally ignores the fact that the trial court made the foregoing findings and argues 
that the parties' lifestyle was in fact financed by their own income. See, e.g., page 12 of Ms. 
Penrose's brief. In attempting to ignore the trial court's findings of fact, Ms. Penrose does 
not do what this court has repeatedly required that appellants in her circumstances do; that is, 
"marshall the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this 
evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be 'against the clear weight 
of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 
481 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). Not only has Ms. Penrose not marshaled the 
evidence, she has not even offered any citations to the record to support her contention that 
the parties' income was somehow sufficient to finance their lifestyle. 
Ms. Penrose also argues that additional alimony should have been awarded because 
Mr. Penrose's personal expenses were minimal in amount. Mr. Penrose testified that he was 
required to reduce his personal expenses for the two-year period between the parties' 
separation and the trial in this matter in order to pay his temporary alimony and child support 
obligations. (Tr. p. 297, R. at 1041.) It is indeed ironic that Ms. Penrose would argue that 
Mr. Penrose's standard of living ought to be reduced substantially below that which the 
couple enjoyed during their marriage so that hers could be raised to the level financed by her 
family's resources. 
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B. The Trial Court Properly Considered the Jones Factors and n> • .wrings 
of Fact Should Not Be Overturned on Appeal. 
In making an av\;;i J o! aiini-no. Cw[t]he trial court is given considerable discretion to 
provide for spousal *uppo-i and M.ieh an award wiP no! w chimed on appeal unless there 
has been a c " . / - • • * * , s 
omitted). The trial court must consider the Jones factors: 
fc\ * ' ;*ie ImaiiCiu. . - ^ Jitiuiih uiiu I'K^U.N OJ II;^ recei\r ^ spouse. *~) me aiMiu/ 
of the receiving spouse to provide a sufficient income for him or herself; and 
(?) the ahilrv of the responding spouse to proxidc supp* *- J tf.csv three 
factors ha\e beer considered, *\e up" n. ; disturb x trnJ court's alimony 
award unless sue! ; serious ine-.airo has resulted a • * manifest a clear abuse 
of d i Q r r e T ^ n " 
In this case, the trial court considered the Jones factors. First, in determining the 
finaiu'ial umdilion and nerds of tin1 inn it\nig spouse the IIMI niiull said 
[P]laintifFs reasonable living expenses are approximately $3,800 per month. 
Both parties claimed excessive expenses which their incomes will not support. 
In part, this is based on the lifestyle they enjoyed during their marriage, which 
was financed not only by the parties' own income from the businesses, but 
savings accrued from their Hawaiian business, and by plaintiffs parents who 
assisted the parties' abiiit\ to enjo\ an extravagant lifestyle. As to plaintiffs 
•• stated monthl) expenses. ••!:•. presently pays no real property taxes or 
^ insurance on the residence • - hich she resides. She is renting that home 
from her father and she testified that she pays rent when she is able to do so. 
Defendant further testified and the court finds credible that plaintiffs father 
pays for the maintenance on the home. Plaintiff currently pays no medical or 
dental insurance premiums, and the •*••;' fun her nd • VVM her telephone 
expense and other expenses, such as entertammem grooming, installment 
payrr1'*"!^ ->^: ;.^-*™~ toYes, are excessive, 
(Findings no -. K ^ M-1 •; _VI 
M^ Penrose's claimed expenses were indeed e\ces<iv -vchm'j the *iLMj\- ^ 
not pa>, Mi! oropern m,^,ranee that she doe*- not p<^* mamienancc that she does not pax, 
$198 per month as a telephone expense, laundry and dry-cleaning expense of $115 per month 
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when she is not employed, $200 per month as child care expense when she is not employed, 
$500 per month as entertainment expense, grooming expenses of $248 per month, $120 per 
month for gasoline, installment payments to her dentist, VISA, Chase Manhattan, 
Mastercard, Nordstrom, and Dillards of $450 per month, and estimated income taxes of $450 
per month. (Plaintiffs Exhibit 12, Addendum C attached hereto.) The trial court had ample 
justification for finding that these expenses were inflated. 
Further, Ms. Penrose's argument ignores the fact that Mr. Penrose does not have 
sufficient net income to pay the alimony she desires. As Bret Winn, Mr. Penrose's 
accountant, testified, under a best case scenario, Mr. Penrose could expect to have $69,481 
net income available to him from Designers Carpet Showroom if he did not have to repay the 
sales tax liability. (Tr. pp. 345-46, R. at 1089-90; Defendant's Exhibit 7, Addendum D 
attached hereto.) If Mr. Penrose does have to pay the sales tax liability out of the business 
profits, he could expect to have between $23,000 and $41,000 in net income available to him. 
(Tr. pp. 345-46, R. at 1089-90; Defendant's Exhibit 9, Addendum E attached hereto.) 
Obviously, he cannot afford to pay the amount of alimony suggested by Ms. Penrose with 
that income. 
Even using the best case scenario, Mr. Penrose has approximately $70,000 in annual 
net income, for a monthly net income of $5,833. If he pays a total of $2,000 in alimony and 
child support to Ms. Penrose, he has $3,833 to live on. Ms. Penrose likewise has $3,800 per 
month to live on. The liability to the Utah State Tax Commission further reduces the net 
income available to Mr. Penrose. 
"In formulating alimony awards, the trial court has broad discretion, and its decisions 
will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion or manifest injustice." Morgan v. 
Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567 (Utah App. 1993) (citations omitted). In Morgan, the findings of 
fact made by the trial court were less specific mathematically than the findings in this case. 
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I lowever, because the trial court had considered the proper factors, this court affirmed the 
ti la! coiii ( s aw ai d of alii norry . • •..,•"•' . • ••' , • : .;• • • ••• ;.' 
Since the trial court: in this case made complete and appropriate findings of fact with 
respect to alimony, this court should not disturb its award. 
BU THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ITS DISTRIBl JTION OF THE PARTIES' PROPERTY AND 
DEBTS, 
j : . - . .:... . .;•., cabw .... ..vJ :,.J panics assets and hainiK.es cqu-.,^ -...^ .vi on 
its findings as to the aniou*; oi tin. liabilities and the value of the assets, Flint division was as 
follows: 
I otal 
Designers Carpet Showroom 
Value $194,000 
Less sa!^  
1.-^  !' - (213,000) 
1 :.. . aki Spoilt 
Ke\ Bank Certificate of Deposit 
Value $ 69,000 
Less lour. (40.0001 
N e t >•'!••• 
1 . . . - i . . i l l i i M W l l g S 
Bronco 
Snowmobiles 

























Ms. Penrose argues that this division of the assets and liabilities is improper for 
several reasons. First, she asserts that the court incorrectly valued the parties' business, 
Designers Carpet Showroom. The parties stipulated to the value determined by Steve 
Nicolatus for the business. Accordingly, the court found that the business had a value of 
$194,000. Ms. Penrose does not attack that finding. However, the trial court found that this 
positive value was offset by the business' sales tax liability to the State of Utah in the amount 
of $213,000. Thus, the court found the net value of the business was zero. 
Ms. Penrose argues in her brief that the liability to the Utah State Tax Commission 
was "contingent." She offers no citation to the record in support of that assertion, nor does 
she marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's finding that the amount of the sales 
tax liability was $213,000, less a possible reduction of approximately $30,000. (Findings no. 
13(a), R. at 614.) This court has repeatedly held that an appellant who attacks a trial court's 
findings of fact has the obligation to marshal the evidence that support those findings and 
"then demonstrate that, despite such evidence, the findings are 'so lacking in support as to be 
against the clear weight of the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous.'" Baker, 866 P.2d 
at 543 (citations omitted). In this case, Ms. Penrose has not made the slightest effort to 
marshal the evidence, nor has she pointed out any contrary evidence. There is no reason for 
this court to interfere with the trial court's finding of fact based, as it is, on uncontro verted 
evidence. (Tr. pp. 141-42, R. at 884-85.) 
In Baker, 866 P.2d 540, the Court of Appeals said: 
In a divorce proceeding there is no fixed formula from which to 
determine the division of property. Watson v. Watson, 837 P.2d 1, 5 (Utah 
App. 1992). Thus, "[w]e afford the trial court 'considerable latitude in 
adjusting financial and property interests, and its actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity.'" Id. (quoting Naranjo v, Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 
1146 (Utah App. 1988)). The trial court's findings of fact are presumed to be 
correct, and because we lack the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses 
testify, we do not make our own findings of fact. (Citations omitted.) 
Id. at 542. 
16 
We will alter the trial court's property division "only if there is a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the law resulting in a substantial and 
prejudicial error, the evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 543 (citations omitted). Ms. Penrose has not argued, nor can she properly do so, that 
such a situation exists in this case. 
Ms. Penrose further argues that the trial court improperly valued the Key Bank 
Certificate of Deposit. Again, the uncontroverted evidence supports the trial court's finding 
of fact. Again, Ms. Penrose has failed to marshal the evidence in support of the finding and 
then explain why the trial court's finding is not supported by the evidence. Mr. Penrose 
testified that he had obtained a certificate of deposit in the original amount of $65,000 and 
had borrowed $40,000 from his grandmother to do so. (Tr. pp. 309-10, R. at 1053-54.) The 
trial court properly ordered him to repay the debt of $40,000 to his grandmother and thus, 
assigned a net value of $29,000 to the certificate of deposit. (Findings no. 13(c), R. at 615.) 
Ms. Penrose also argues that the trial court should have reduced the value of the cash 
awarded to her by the amount she claimed to owe to her father or have treated that "debt" as a 
marital obligation. However, this argument ignores the fact that the entire debt to Ms. 
Penrose's father was incurred after the parties' separation (Tr. p. 298, R. at 1042.) Further, 
much of the debt, totaling $43,725.20, was for attorneys' fees and detective fees, the 
remainder of the obligation was incurred for Ms. Penrose's personal expenses incurred after 
the parties' separation. In fact, the arrangement between Ms. Penrose and her father was that 
he purchased a house for her, that she did not pay rent on a regular basis, and that he paid 
many of her other living expenses. 
During the time that Ms. Penrose was incurring the alleged obligation to her father, 
Mr. Penrose was paying her temporary alimony and child support pursuant to the court's 
order and she was receiving monthly income from her family trust in the amount of 
approximately $1,000 per month. She has offered no rationale for her theory that Mr. 
17 
Penrose ought somehow to finance her living beyond her means by borrowing from her 
father. 
Also, the trial court ruled that Ms. Penrose had adequate funds to pay her own 
attorneys' fees. Ms. Penrose's attorneys' fees should not be considered a marital obligation 
in the property division any more than Mr. Penrose's fees were considered a marital 
obligation. 
Based on the trial court's findings of fact, the trial court made a 50/50 division of the 
property of the parties. Ms. Penrose has offered no basis for her assertion that the findings of 
fact are not supported by the evidence and this court should affirm the decision of the trial 
court. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S CHILD SUPPORT AWARD DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Ms. Penrose argues that the trial court erred in awarding child support of $669 per 
month, because $669 would be the appropriate amount of child support to order pursuant to 
the child support guidelines if the parties' combined gross income totaled $10,000. 
According to Ms. Penrose, the trial court erred by failing to award a higher amount of child 
support when the parties' combined adjusted gross income totaled $11,032. 
Ms. Penrose's argument misconstrues UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.12. That section 
provides as follows: 
If the combined adjusted gross income exceeds the highest level 
specified in the table, an appropriate and just child support amount shall be 
ordered on a case-by-case basis, but the amount ordered may not be less than 
the highest level specified in the table for the number of children due support. 
This statute simply directs the trial court to order an appropriate and just amount of child 
support, not less than the highest level specified in the table. In this case, the court did award 
the highest amount specified in the table and therefore has followed the statute precisely. 
IS 
Ms. Penrose argues that the trial court was required to consider the factors set forth in 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7(3) and that its failure to do so constituted an abuse of 
discretion. However, § 78-45-7(3) applies to situations where the court has found sufficient 
evidence to rebut the guidelines. In this case, Ms. Penrose did not argue at trial, nor did the 
trial court find, that sufficient evidence had been introduced to rebut the guidelines. 
In Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006 (Utah App. 1996), the Utah Court of Appeals held 
that, when the adjusted gross incomes exceeded the guideline amount, simple linear 
extrapolation from the child support guidelines was not appropriate. If the court wishes to 
award support beyond the guideline amount, the Ball court said, it must make appropriate 
findings. In this case, since the trial court awarded the correct guideline amount as it is 
permitted to do under the statute, additional findings are not necessary. In addition, Ms. 
Penrose did not present any evidence of special needs of Miles, the parties' child, for child 
support beyond the guideline amount. 
The trial court awarded the correct amount of child support under the guidelines and 
then awarded sufficient alimony to make up the deficiency between Ms. Penrose's and Miles' 
reasonable needs and the amount of income Ms. Penrose is able to produce. The trial court's 
child support award should be affirmed. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO AWARD ATTORNEYS' FEES TO MS. 
PENROSE. 
In a divorce, "[t]he decision to make such an award and the amount thereof rest 
primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court." Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah 
App. 1993.) In this case, the trial court found that Ms. Penrose has "sufficient monetary 
assets based on the property division to pay the debt for her attorneys' fees." (Findings no. 
15, R. at 617.) 
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The Court of Appeals has indicated that if the court is to award fees, it must consider 
the financial need of the receiving spouse, the ability of the other spouse to pay, and the 
reasonableness of the requested fees. In this case, the court first considered the financial need 
of the receiving spouse, Ms. Penrose, and determined that she had not shown a need for 
assistance with her attorneys' fees. The court therefore did not consider the other two factors, 
since Ms. Penrose had not met the first requirement. It is difficult to understand Ms. 
Penrose's argument that the court is still required to consider the reasonableness of the fees 
requested, when in fact the court has determined that fees should not be awarded because of a 
lack of need. 
Again, Ms. Penrose has ignored the trial court's finding of fact that she was awarded 
sufficient monetary assets to pay her attorneys' fees. She was awarded $109,000 in cash, 
which clearly supports the notion that she can afford to pay her attorneys' fees, a substantial 
portion of which had already been paid by her father. In light of the failure of Ms. Penrose to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's finding, it is difficult to meet her argument 
that the court was somehow required to consider the other factors, even though the court 
found that she had not satisfied the threshold requirement that she show a need for assistance 
with her fees. 
Ms. Penrose also ignores the fact that her father had already paid most of her fees and 
that a portion of the debt she claimed to owe her father was for fees. In effect, Ms. Penrose 
sought a double recovery—repayment of the debt to her father and an award of fees. 
Further, even if the trial court were required to consider the reasonableness of the 
fees, there is little question that the fees were unreasonable. Ms. Penrose changed attorneys 
voluntarily twice. She was first represented by Sharon Donovan of Dart, Adamson & 
Donovan. She then retained Craig Peterson of Littlefield & Peterson. When Mr. Peterson 
died, she was represented by Ann Wassermann for a period of time. Then, just a few weeks 
before trial, she retained Clark Sessions, resulting in a continuance of the trial date. Her 
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claimed fees and costs totaled $89,000. By contrast, Mr. Penrose's legal fees for the same 
period were approximately $20,000. 
The trial court correctly found that Ms. Penrose had not shown a need for assistance 
in payment of her attorneys' fees. 
CONCLUSION 
In making the arguments set forth in her brief, Ms. Penrose has simply attempted to 
ignore the trial court's complete and adequate findings of fact on each of the issues raised in 
her brief. The trial court made all the required findings with respect to the issue of alimony 
and properly made an alimony award based on those findings. 
Likewise, the trial court divided the property and obligations of the parties equally 
based on its findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
The child support award also meets the requirements of Utah law and the child 
support guidelines. 
Finally, the court's refusal to award attorneys' fees was also based on appropriate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law which are supported by the record. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be affirmed in all 
respects. 
DATED this 29th day of July, 1996. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK, L.L.C. 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-2034 
ELLEN IV^AVCOCK 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
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30-3-4. Pleadings — Findings — Decree — Use of affidavit 
— Sealing. 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the plaintiff or 
plaintiffs attorney. 
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default or otherwise 
except upon legal evidence taken in the cause. If the decree is to be entered 
upon the default of the defendant, evidence to support the decree may be 
submitted upon the affidavit of the plaintiff with the approval of the court. 
(c) If the plaintiff and the defendant have a child or children and the 
plaintiff has filed an action in the judicial district as defined in Section 
78-1-2.1 where the pilot program shall be administered, a decree of divorce 
may not be granted until both parties have attended a mandatory course 
provided in Section 30-3-11.3 and have presented a certificate of course 
completion to the court. The court may waive this requirement, on its own 
motion or on the motion of one of the parties, if it determines course 
attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in 
the best interest of the parties. 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held before the court or 
the court commissioner as provided by Section 78-3-31 and rules of the 
Judicial Council. The court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall 
enter the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree after default 
of the defendant, upon the plaintiff's affidavit. 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by order of the court 
upon the motion of either party. The sealed portion of the file is available to the 
public only upon an order of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of 
record or attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office of 
Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied for or is receiving 
public assistance, or the court have full access to the entire record. This sealing 
does not apply to subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1211; L. Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-
1909, ch. 60, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 2999; R.S. 1933 ment, effective July 1, 1995, added the second 
& C. 1943, 40-3-4; L. 1957, ch. 55, § 1; 1961, sentence of Subsection (l)(b) and in the second 
ch. 69, § 1; 1969, ch. 72, § 2; 1983, ch. 116, sentence of Subsection (l)(d) substituted "shall 
§ 1; 1985, ch. 151, § 1; 1989, ch. 104, § 1; enter the decree" for "shall make and file find-
1990, ch. 230, § 1; 1991, ch. 5, § 35; 1992, ch. ings and decree" and added the language begin-
98, § 1; 1992, ch. 290, § 3; 1995, ch. 62, § 1. ning "or, in the case of" at the end. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Determination of ali-
mony — Nonmeritorious petition for modifica-
tion. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it 
equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and 
parties. The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
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(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
* (i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of 
joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabili-
ties and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order 
assessing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing 
fee to be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of 
Recovery Services within the Department of Human Services for the 
purposes of income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, 
Parts 4 and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
child care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance, 
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations for 
debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best 
interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer 
enforcement, the court may include in an order establishing a visitation 
schedule a provision, among other things, authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered visitation schedule entered under this chapter. 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order by 
a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursuant to 
Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted by the 
court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the 
other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; and 
(iv) the length of the marriage. 
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(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining 
alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, 
existing at the time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance 
with Subsection (a). However, the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
standard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short 
duration, when no children have been conceived or born during the 
marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at the 
time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equal-
ize the parties' respective standards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a 
major change in the income of one of the spouses due to the collective 
efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the marital 
property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the efforts of both 
spouses during the marriage, the court may make a compensating 
adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, 
and no children have been conceived or born during the marriage, the 
court may consider restoring each party to the condition which existed at 
the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive 
changes and new orders regarding alimony based on a substantial 
material change in circumstances not forseeable at the time of the 
divorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for 
alimony to address needs of the recipient that did not exist at the time 
the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating circum-
stances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse 
of the payor may not be considered, except as provided in this 
subsection. 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial 
ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse 
if the court finds that the payor's improper conduct justifies that 
consideration. 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination 
of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates 
upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if the 
party paying alimony is made a paTty to the action of annvklment and his rights 
are determined. 
(9) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
TabB 
PENROSE v. PENROSE 














v -, ,--. ^ 
i : 9 "• 
" 21 '«"< 
• "* {... >"\ ";-
8/29/V-
8/30/Q3 
11 '21 ~~ 
















I M I dun mi 11: 














































1 , ( i . i i i 
Loan 














? in '94 
3/7/94 
-i 14 94 
3/31/94 































8 , . 
880 
7 
2 5 " 7 
C .. 













i 11. 'i 1 1 












6 fi 94 
7/5/94 
7/24 '94 
7/24 9 4 
7 ^4 '.4 



































10 '12, 94 
10/19 94 


















J. S . L. A. 
Anesthasia Debt 




Prof essi oi lal 
Alarm 





































, 9J 2.2 5 





30C • :: :: 
500 00 
,3 :i 3 o :: 





























LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
*?Tfti 
r 4*frri+f -A^r* 
Kay Bank of Utaft 
3100 South Stats Ottlot 
City. Utah S411S 
MMn / \ < S . K ^ > 7 ^ - £ 
^ i 5U000 7 3?i: E,l,0 5 ? n a B i i ' 2R50 /OOOOD5 2E,aO.'' 
\ > « i • 
,









.l vi t 
, - A 
i y • 
u/ 
S 
, , 1 :• i / 
- ^ / . L/ ; / 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
SMO HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY. UTAH 84121 
4 6 6 3 
JllT „9S 11-73/Ot 
%\/Zooo;**l 
MJBAN&. MtLMwOlyJMMI 
< I 21.0007 3 ?i:^^rn^B*^X E.E.3 / 000 1100000/ 
J?. /?fS 
//,/'*. . . A . ..«*.. / -• 7^r*. 
,,| ' ^ i : < ; ^ 
J?. 
'0 / / J K { , / *T* '"7** i ' j " ^ 
/>- /" ci ; s « ^ /ffg' 
JW 
\J-<*.£.£!. < : '., £.: ?. t **L.X 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n -63 
5040 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOLL/DAJ, UTAH 84121 
11-73/1240 
PAV TO THE 
?H ORDER OF 
4914 
^ / V T ^ < - J $ ^ T ^ ^ * 
> * ^ V _ _ K«v B«n* of Utaft 
K J V J P ^ T P 3100 Sout* SIM* Offte* 
D D A I S V 9011 toumSiai*Strwt 
K O A M A ft*lt LWU Qty, man Mi ift 
MEMO. 
,_. _ D O L L A i>» 
i : i2 l fOOO?3?i: E>if05?UBBna UHIU /0000 500000.' 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 1143 
. 6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOLLADAY. UTAH B4121 
31-73/1240 
/ 
y E i C ^ T T 3l001oiimSlMtOffio« • / f iboi si
S J J A N J ^ fttft LAM C* . UMA M11ft 
MEMO J, z,i 
i : i 2U000 7 3 7i: E>i.05?iiflB«' UR5i / 0 0 0 0 U 5 0 0 0 0 
ffc LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-M 
6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOLLADAY. UTAH 64121 
i i - n / i M i 5 0 0 1 
B g c V i r 3i3o«««»«~of*» 
•*ML«WC«y.UM*ft411ft 
MEMO. 
i :;2UOOO?3 7i: &1.0 5 7 UBB»- 5 0 0 1 
(h LLOYD G. HANSEN 1143 5840 HOLLAOAY BLVD 277-6775 5 / 






) South 81 
ETA V T V * * 1 South Wmm straot 
O A T l f t Jty\ \jmm City. tmn M i l l 
i A KoyatnkofUtih 
i V ^ l T * W>8outh8to»01ttoi 
i - J ^ - - " - 9011 South StatoStm 
MEMO. 
1:1 2^0DO?3?i: g l D S T l i a a i 1 5026 
5026 
w. 
S 3 , 5 ^ °* 
/Q000 3 50000.'' 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
584fti<OLLADAY BLVD. 277-8775 
HOLLAOAY, UTAH 84121 
7? / 




fr // »£Z 
•M 7>J stJ/0 ** J> Ym °*-ARS 
Koy Bonk of Utah 
3100 South StttoOfftoo 
3011 South S U M StfMt 
Suit Lite Ctty, Utth S4116 
«:ieI,QOD?3?i: &uo5?uaa»f so?2 /0000U30000/ 
a LLOYD Q. HANSEN 11-63 
6840 HOLLAOAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOLLAOAY. UTAH 84121 
31-73/12(0 5105 
D ^  21 JJ yc? 




Soft U M CM* Uttfi M11t 
^ ^ ^ " " 
1:; 21,000 7 3 ?»: &U057UBBH* 510 5 S 0 0 0 0 2 50000 . ' 
<4*' LLOYD G. HANSEN 11« 
6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
*' 4 
3 W V t t « 0 5426 
M-/? i9-2f 
s ,57n ° J 
UTTtLARS 
• E V ^ T T 3100iouift»*• 
I B B A N K MtUMQur.Ui 
om* 
MEMO. jfe***^—' 
M i l l ' • 
\ 
i:.21,000?3?« &uo5?iifiaw siiZt / O Q O Q O 5 B Q Q O / 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11^  
6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 2?74 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 8*1*1 
3i«I3,IIJ*) 5436 
1^ / / C ^ JI^JC^^XSM *^?f%<ri - © - O I L . 
toy tank el lMtt 
J100" 
J hGAANJt 8tftUi*Cliy,UltfiMm 
1:121.0007371: &uo5 7 u a a i f 51,3c. /000003iOUB.'' 
LLOYD, G. HANSEN 11-63 
31-73/1M0 5456 
5B40 HOU^OAY BLVD. 277-6776 
21 HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
- D O L i 
May • « * of Uttft 
3100 t o n * SUM C 
3001 t o * * • * • ) • • 
••ii u*» p?r mm §«i if 
t: l 21«000 7 3 7i: C.1.057UBBN* 5U5& /0Q00L7R000.' 
5iV LLOYD G. HANSEN 11*3 6640 HOUAOAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 64121 
31-71/1240 
/ * £ . *?<> i° 
5106 
MEMO 
i:;21,0007371: &t,05?uaa«a S IDE. /OOOOIUOOOO.1' 
j.V LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-63 
6640 HOLLAOAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 64121 
31-73/1240 
. B PAY TO THE 






sieo •ouw mam otiie* 
M l LM« C%. UWIM1U 
i : i2l .000 7 3 7i: &1.057Uaaic 5 U 7 /OOOOO 7 2000/ 
f 1 LLOYD G. HANSEN 11*3 r « 4 0 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6776 3W3/U40 5348 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 64121 
•U PAY TO THE 
ORDER OF, 
rrfao**^ r>*K fa>«j£4/ D O L L A R S ^ g / -
J3±Z>Z_ 
i : i2 i ,000 7 3 7i: &U05?liaa«* 531,8 /oooomoooo, 
1 LLOYD G. HANSEN 11 -63 . ° ° * * 5640 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOUADAY, UTAH 64121 / / Y & %S 
SBANK 
My ton* of Utah 
9100 South S I M Offtet 
30*1 tout* Sicta Slro* 
6ftft Lift* City. Ulan §411ft 
MEMO. 
i:i2i.ooo7 3 7i: &it0 5 7uaaif 5522 /ooooouaooo/ 
•••••BBBHBHBBBBBIHHBaEBMnHBBBHHiHBIBHH^^ 
V^  LLOYD G. HANSEN i i « 3W3"*° 5 5 3 6 
5640 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
. HOUADAY, UTAH 64121 
iftvt'n 
Cfty.UiaftMllft 
i ^ V _ _ KoyaankofUiafl 
O A M I i •aniaaoCfty.ui 
i:izifQ00?37i: &1.057 USB* - ssa& /OOOOIVBUDO. 
LLOYD G. HANSEN i i « >UW™ 5539 
5640 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOUADAY, UTAH 64121 ^ . 
I E x A T T 3100Boutfit«M»Offlot 
I Q D A U V JOlltouMtMltSlfWl 
MEMO. 
m 21.000 ?i?i: EiU0 5 7uaaii< ssaq /oooooaRUR;.-' 
'^
l
 " LLOYD G. HANSEN m o 3i-73/ia40 5 5 4 4 
HOUADAY BLVD. 277-0776 5840 HC 
HOUADAY, UTAH 84121 — T ~ 
$ 4 <££>,*-
a C ^ n T nootoumtiMtOffiot 
4 0 A T I & t«t L«M city, m * M U I 
iO i ; 
I L L A R S 
^ r i "gM~ VirfrVt. 
«: i 21,000 7 3 7i." &if0 5?UBBN a 5 511* /OOOO 3 5 0 0 0 0 / 
^ LLOYD G. HANSEN i i « 3M3/1240 5585 
6840 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOUADAY, UTAH 64121 - ^ - / 
PAY TO THE 
' A 1 yj*/J,//r*rcX'**'T ' $ &606, °3 





i:i2i«ooo?3?i: &uo5 7uaa^ 55a5 /ooooaooooo. 
J \ LLOYD G. HANSEN n « 31.73/1240 5 5 9 9 
> 6640 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOUADAY, UTAH 64121 
PAY TO THE 
*H ORDER O F -
Sin Sou* tela c 
MEMO 
i:ietf000?3?i: &itO STUBBY ssqq /ODDDDaaooD/ 
yv LLOYD G. HANSEN n « 
5840 HOLUOAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY. UTAH 64121 
PAY TO THE 
• 8 ^ ^ V ^ _ Koy Bon* of m»h 
i Q v r T T 3100South8tM» 
I 0 D A 1 3 V aositoumttMs 
I M O A M & tattLoM.dty.m 
Offioa 
£*y.UlftJtt4l1f . " # , - ~ 
MEMO. 
i:i2&<000?3?i: &lt05?UBBiia 5&01 / 0 0 0 0 0 70000.'' 
^ 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 5614 
PAY TO THE 
3J] ORDER OF 
SO-ir »' BANK S1^c*7u«.«iti 
MEMO 
i l l ! 1.0007 3?-: 61.057 l IBB* 56H. /OOOOOOSOOO/ 
fc LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-63 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 5647 
PAY TO THE 
W^LLARS 
Koy M M el Ulan 
3100" 
•ON LtM c * . mon §4ii§ 
MEMO. 
/ ^ - T H ^ 
i : i e i t 0 0 0 ? 3 ? i : E ^ o s T u a a f s&u? •l,OD000 2 5 700.», 
* UOYD G. HANSEN 1143 
5840 HOUADAY BLVD. 277*775 
HOUADAY, UTAH 64121 
31-73/1240 
PAY TO THE 
3 | ORDER O ^ 





S10O tOUBl • » OOtei 
•3M1 toum ktu* tewi 
•Mt U M . U y . MM» M i l l 
j * 1 *»• r\r\r*ri g a . i C.,1, H C *3 IJLOtli i l M 4 n ^ n ^ ^ n l o n o m 
4 
> 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
5840 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOUADAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 5669 
J- /* " ^ 
PAY TO THE 
SH ORDER OF 
MEMO. 
il . / ^ X^^J^Ci^. DOLLARS 
D E v ^ T T T SiOOSotmiSiatoi 
I D D A M V aotitomnsMiai 




151,000?3?•: &i,05?iiaa»* 5&&1 /OOOOOUSOOOi'* 
t:;51,0007371: &LJ05?iiBB«• s&&q / Q D O O O U S O O O / 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
5840 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOUADAY. UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 5660 
K w r i ^ 
•D * ^ ^ V »Uy ten* of Uttft 
B E v ^ T f T aiooacMMtiaiMi 
I Mi tUiNl t . ••iiLftjwaiy.uitftftim 
i:*si«ooo?3 7i: &uo5?uaa>* s&ao 
„ y y^* 1 $ osf?6° &/X*4f 
/ooooo&aaoo,< 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n « 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 
PAY TO THE / 
?H ORWKOF ^ l i 
S| 
5733 
$ ^ * - ° 
- D O L L A R S 
< ^ V _ _ »Uy B«rt<i of uun 
a S J ^ T T 3100 8o»i«ft SttM Offlea 
? O A \ j r 30ll«oumMMB8owi 
4 A A M f t J * t Law Cfty. UHh Mt10 
I : I ? U O O O ? 3 ? I : duos?UBBII* 5733 /ooooo&iioo/ 
Jk LLOYD Q. HANSEN 11-B 
\ > M40 HOUAOAY BL*6.NC?=«T76 
31-73/1M0 5764 
HOUAOAY, UTAH «4121 
v-jj.x „?r [\\mk\ m^ 4VJ?jrf 
K B A N K 8tMLM«Cfty.UUIit411i 
i:isuooo?37i: &uo5?uaaw s?&i. /OOOOOUiBSt./ 
* 
LLOYD G. HANSEN .11-83 
5840 HOLLADAY. BLVD. 277-8775 
^ HOLLADAY, yTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 5765 
PAY TO THE 
ORDER OF 





3100 (ouo> saw onto* 
miOoutnMMLAuMi 
flfftb* 
i : i2U000 7 3 7i: EAO 5 7 UBflw 5 7&S .••00000 S 5000 / 
w:i EUQOO?3?i:a3& 1 gltOSTllBB* /OOOOi50000/ 
LLOYDG/R!AL^!Sfi02 0 S 0 3 1 2f:,hOH^, 
HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 Q Q Q O 0 1 "? C\ ^ 1 | - | /' 
HOLLADAY. UTAH 64121 • -— A S*T/-r- «*• V V 
V y T 3100toiflh8MttOmc« 
A V T T aoti soutti sait strMt 
<* / *> 
City. I Bfe«f 
t:i2i.ooo?a?i:2a&2 &uos?uaa»* 
DOLLARS 
/0000 1 50000/ 
l«» LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-63 
5640 HOLLAOAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLAOAY. UTAH 64121 
2363 
$ t&a *° 
-i:i2i.OOO?3?i:2 3E.3 E^OSTUBB"* /ooooouoooo/ 
Q. HANSEN n« - - 0 0 0 0 0 1 ^ b -* 1 * W ' LLOYD G.  
5840 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOUADAY, UTAH M121 
• T 4 W ^ ^^3—. 
K#y tor* of Utah 
3100 South S U M Oflioo 
30S1 South SUM StrMt 
L * M City. Utah S411* 
; i 2 l , 0 0 0 7 37i: 21. 2? 6UD57 I IBB* 
- D O L L A R S 
^<3 f^c^Z ^ 
/oooo ;ooooo.'' 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n-83 
W40 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6776 
HOLLAOAY, UTAH 64121 
•AY TO THI S\j%-^ . . S^S? 
1209 
/—** 19 . ^ ^ 3173/1240 
<^>*< I otpiioF,,^ ^^rtyr A * * / ^*Af/s 6*C 
* • ? * • ( * of Utah 
3100 South 8tataOfnoa 
30S1 South StatftStraat 
,Utah*4110 
+*: i euooo?a?in soq &I«QS? i IBB* /aaaa 121100/ 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11*3 
8840 HOUADAY BLVD. 277-67Z6 
- . HQLUOW, UTAH 84121 *~* 
PAY TO THI 
3H OR08K 
3^73/1840 2522 
4*0JS8U)£9)MflP6 81^ 0045 KisctlUMOUS 
K i W I M M " * > • 
O W . U M « 4 1 t t , 
MEMO. 
OABMk^«UM.CMi 
t : i 2 U 3 0 0 7 3?»: 6 L J 0 5 7 ; l a a • , 2522 /ODOD ^OOOOO.^  
/ 
* 
PAY TO THE 
ORDER O F -
LLOYD G. HANSEN n«63 
8840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
• O I O L L A D J L X O E A * W121 ^ 
31-73/1240 2523 
1 $^fc>, * -
. D O L L A R S 
K t y M M o f U M 
31d0tOuVlMM( _ , im\%*mmmmmn* . ^± ^* <L i 
i: l 2I.000 7 3 7I! E.U057UBBH* 2523 /0000020000. 
A LLOYD^^ UN' W 2 £' ,=l S1-^ ^ H- 2 1 0 2 ? 2&S 
6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 f-'l f l l"l I ' l I "l 1 f l L . * ' Cl R - . < - . -
HOLLADAY. UTAH 84121 " • • • • *••' - ' ' - ' * ^ ' T 6 1 U . J & 
<* 
Aas-f . D PAY TO THE ORDER OF ^ " ^ 1 9 ^ T 
* • ? • « * Of UUA 
3100 loumsta* Off** 
30tl Sou* 8l»» tout 
DOLLARS 
MEMO. 
/ 1 •: 121.0007 3 ?•: £1,0 5 7 Uflfl«« 25 21 
733-132-6if 
&*****•+~ - » 
/00000 50000.'' 
f. LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-63 6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-8775-
- HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
3W3/1240 2598 
PAY TO THE 
}H ORDER OF 
^-& »?r 
<"T ~tf-
^ W _ _ KtVlMMOfUIMl 
V X ™ i r 31«> •out* Stan Offio» 
B A V 1 V 30t1 Beultitali(Mraal 
• •MLaMCtty .UMlMl l t ^ 
/ I i: i 2 i . 0 0 0 7 3 7i: £1.0 5 7 UBB"1 2 5=18 /OObOOEOOOO.' 
LLOYD G. HANSEN i i « 
6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277^776 
HOLIADAY, UTAH 64121 
31-73/1240 2653 
PAY TO THE 
ORDWflti 
/,M/,£/J. *&"-** vSof 
>ARS 
i A Koy BwiK ol mart f / j V / n r 3100South SIM*Of»oa 
I t f l i m 30t1SoiJttiSlM»Strwt 
& SaltLMoCfty.UiftfiMllt 
«:LPUODO?3?I: EiitOSTuaaif E&sa 






I _-• -- U 
A?- /<?. ^ -
< _ LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-as 
6840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277««7T6 
*• . HOUADAY. UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 2823 
j saggy. S/S/^$j "&£»»* J $ 3.m.zr 
.DOLLARS 
KiyBinkotUlin 
3100 South SUM Otlloa 
MEMO 
IBANK ffiu2cE558i» 
I-.. 2l.000 7 3 7i: £1,0 5? I •aBi' 2a 2 3 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-83 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277^775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 2908 
RPER oyj J^> i *'h-' />*&A£0*~C | J /#&/,/£. PAY TO THE SH O D  OF 
MEMO 
IBANK tn LtHttCJly, Utah 04116 
Hi21.000 7 3 71: &uo5 7uaaH- 2«ioa /oooo i a a u 2 / 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n-83 
S840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775/7 
HOLLADAY. UTAH 84121 V 
J1-7J/1240 3099 
FAY TO THE 
ORDER OF 
lUy ten* ot Utah 
3100 South 8ta» Ofttot 
3081 South 8ta* StrMt !3<Hr 
fauBANK 8^tL*MQty.m^»4116 
MEMO. 
i:i2UD00737i: BUOBTiiaB"' 30=^ 
.'•00000 2 5000.'' 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n-83 
5640 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY. UTAH 84121 
PArrome 
H ORDER OF 
^ 
Aj^^ /^ry f/rreif' 
^V**" sO£rs?~<rs. 
MEMO. 
i V y T T siooaeuMaMtome* 
4 0 A N & aMUUCKy.UMKMIIt 
i : iauooo737i: &t«05?uaan* 3100 / 0 0 0 0 0 7 5000.'' 
ii0»D45aa*\s5o35S5^rraBnst 
0 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 O O C\ \*\ C\ 'I O vXg? »4^ - Y 1 " ' 
/ 0 0 0 0 0 20000.'' 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11 -83 
5840 HOLLADAY-BLVD. 277-6775 
" " * HOLLADAY; UTAH 84121" 
31-73/1240 
PAY TO THE |H ORDEROF^A y * * * ^ S ^ p <Q &?j;tjL 
Kay Bank of Utah 
3100 South Stat* Ofttea 
tSOBI South Stat* Straat 8attLaMy€fty.Utaha4llS * 
3098 
L L A R S 
- 1 at nnn7 3?i: &lf0 5 7 l IBB"" 30RB / 0 D 0 0 D 1 ^ 7 0 0 / 
LLOYD 6 . HANSEN 11-63 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
TAY TO THE 
ORDER OF re ¥-4^/"?* 
31-73/1240 3095 
/-3*/ io % r 
1 $ im 
. D O L L A R S 
Kay •ana el Utah 
3100 Sooth Stata Offlea 
fVNK M l < O A H & iLauCMy.UMnMUS 
i;igi.ooo7 3 7i; &i.05 7iiaaiii soqs /0000030000/ 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n « 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLAOAY. UTAH 84121 
J .-73/ 1240 
JL- * 
PAY TO THE S j 
$H ORDER OF ^ ^ -
jfl \U1>C~~ K«Y &•** of Utah 
•Q J C J O - 1 I T 3100 South StataOfhca 
B B o A V T E T 3081 South 8Wa Stioat 
I » B A N K 8att U*a C*y. Utah §4115 
r / 
i:i2itD00 7a?i: EAO 5 ?UBB« - a n o 
rLTOLLARS 
/ 0 0 0 0 E 50000. ' 
UOYD G. HANSEN n o 
•^-SBfiTHQLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOLLADAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 
„ PAYTOTHE / ^ / * 
IB OOCROF ^ ' 
Kay Ban* of U t a h ' ' 
31B1 
3100 South Stata Offlca 
3081 South Stata Straat 
Salt U*o City. Utah 64116 
MEMO /c£^ te^r /<i*9*xr* 
H 121*000 7 3 7H E>UQ5?UaBn« 3 IB I . ' ,0000 2 3QQQO.i 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11^3 
.$840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
-~ HOLLAOAY, UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 
•H *" TrfXJ^nPT 3100 South Staia Offlca 
i '- S D A V T T 3081 South Stata Suaat 
1 * ."* flMllAMJNy Salt L * i City, Utah S411S 
\t-n/4sr<f» forest 
3 1 8 : 
L-IVOLLARS 
• : i 2 l . 0 0 0 7 3 7i: E.I.057UBBH* 31B? /0000S0000C 
LLOYD G. HANSEN 11-B3 
5840 HOLLADAY BLVD. 277-6775 
31-73/1240 3186 
PAY TO THE 





•n * of Utah / 
3~<7- »*X-
'yso*7f 
« ,^W *«y Ban* 
J V J ^ T T 3100 Soutn 8 u u Ottw» 
} O A \ w 3081 South Stato StfMt 
4 A A M A SaitLafttCtty. UtAh»4115 
i R S 
MEMO. Lt^£_ 
>:ieuooo737i: &uo5?UBa»- 3ia& /ooooL;5??cja, 
LLOYD G. HANSEN n-83 
5840 HOLIAOAY BLVD. 277-6775 
HOUAOAY. UTAH 84121 
31-73/1240 
/£ 
PAY TO THE 
3369 
/y <T? 'F** »& 
• | G C > T P 3100 South SMI* C 
I S t f i O T SOUBoutttSttiaf 
• CMy.Uiaft 04116 
MEMO. 
.DOLLARS 
i:iEit000 73?i: gliDSTHVB*0 336^ /DDDD aDDDOD/ 
TabC 
PENROSE v, PENROSE 
Civil No. 93490224 DA 
Plaintiff's Monthly Expenses 
Rent $ 1,150.00 
Real property taxes (residence) 154.56 
Real property insurance (residence) 49.49 
Maintenance (residence) 269.88 
Food and household supplies 400.00 
Utilities including water, electricity, gas and heat 155.78 
Telephone 198.00 
Laundry and cleaning 115.00' 
Clothing 425.00 
Medial and Dental Insurance premium 250.00 
Medical 90.83 
Dental 100.00 
Child care 200.00 
Entertainment/Travel including Jazz tickets 500.00 
Grooming 248.00 
Gifts 100.00 
Auto expense (gas, oil, repair, insurance) 329.50 
Auto payments (leased) 338.00 
Installment payments (Smith $100; Visa $100; 
Chase $100; MC $100; Nordstrom $25; Dillard's $25) 450.00 
Income Taxes (estimated) 450.00 
TOTAL EXPENSES $ 5,974.041 
Includes expenses for Miles Penrose. 
TabD 
Karen Penrose v. Jeffrey Penrose 
Civil No. 93 490 2224 
Designers Carpet Showroom 
Earnings Available To Owner 
Sales Tax Liability Satisfied Through Escrow and Other Funds and No Buyout 
Adjusted Average Avenge 1994 Actual 
Expected net earnings of DCS per valuation report $ 80,000 $ 90,000 $107,000 
Workers Compensation expense adjustment 1 (9.345) (9.345) (9.345) 
Net earnings available for owner (cash basis) $ 70,655 $ 80,655 $ 97,655 
Taxable earnings available to owner $ 70,655 $ 80,655 $ 97,655 
Exemption and standard deduction (6.250) (6.250) (6.250) 
Taxable income $64,405 $74,405 $91,405 
Tax liability (estimate) (18,454) (22,054) (28,174) 
Total cash available to owner (net earnings less tax liability) $ 52.201 $ 58.601 $ 69.481 
Represents future costs of complying with 5/1/95 statute re subcontractors and workers compensation 
assumed recurring lost profits of 50% of expected subcontractor payments of $210,000 @ 8.9% (1994 Workers 
Compensation premium). 
TabE 
Karen Penrose v. Jeffrey Penrose 
Civil No. 93 490 2224 
Designers Carpet Showroom 
Earnings Available To Owner—No Buyout 
Expected net earnings of DCS per valuation report 
Sales tax liability-(assume $203,731 @ 11% for 7 years 1) 
Workers Compensation expense adjustment 
Net earnings available to owner (cash basis) 
Taxable earnings available to owner 
Exemption and standard deduction 
Taxable income 
Tax liability (estimate) 
Total cash available to owner: 






























Sales tax liability per assessment 
Interest from June 1994 through June 1995 ($30.16/day) 
First quarter 1995 unfunded sales tax liability 






Represents future costs of complying with 5/1/95 statute re subcontractors and workers compensation 
assumed recurring lost profits of 50% of expected subcontractor payments of $210,000 @ 8.9% (1994 Workers 
Compensation premium). 
